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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs seeking to challenge government surveillance programs
have faced long odds in federal courts, due mainly to a line of Supreme Court cases that have set a very high bar to Article III standing
1
in these cases. The origins of this jurisprudence can be directly
∗

1
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The “case or controversy” requirement of Article III standing doctrine has developed to
require that plaintiffs demonstrate “injury in fact” that is “certainly impending,” a difficult
task for those seeking to challenge government programs whose secrecy often prohibits
access to supporting evidence. See, e.g., Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 55, 69–70
(2013); Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights,
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 53 (1985); Heather Elliott,
The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 461 (2008); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988); Gene R. Nichol Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72
CAL. L. REV. 68, 102 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168 (1992); Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing
and Secret Surveillance, 10 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO SOC’Y 551, 552 (2014).
While it is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is worth noting here that standing doctrine has long been a favorite topic of argument within law review articles. For a list, see
Nichol, supra, at 68 n.3. Black letter standing doctrine—to the extent there is such a
thing—begins with the basic rule that a plaintiff may only have standing before a federal
court if she has satisfied the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III, by showing
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traced to Laird v. Tatum, a 1972 case where the Supreme Court considered the question of who could sue the government over a surveillance program, holding in a 5-4 decision that chilling effects arising
“merely from the individual’s knowledge” of likely government surveillance did not constitute adequate injury to meet Article III stand2
ing requirements. Federal courts have since relied—and built—
upon Laird to deny standing to plaintiffs in surveillance cases, including the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Interna3
tional USA. But the facts behind Laird illuminate a number of important reasons why it is a weak basis for surveillance standing
doctrine. It is therefore a worthwhile endeavor, I think, to reexamine
Laird in a post-Snowden context in order to gain a deeper understanding of the Court’s standing doctrine in surveillance cases.
I. ARMY SURVEILLANCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS
The facts behind Laird originated with a January 1970 article in
The Washington Monthly, titled CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches
4
Civilian Politics. The article was written by Christopher Pyle, a lawyer
and former Army military intelligence officer, who revealed that

2
3

4

that she has suffered an “injury in fact,” that her injury has been caused by the conduct
found in the complaint, and that her injury is redressable by the court. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy. . . . In exercising
this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.” (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581
(1992) (“[T]he party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete
and personal way. . . . [This requirement] preserves the vitality of the adversarial process
by assuring both that the parties before the court have an actual . . . stake in the outcome,
and that ‘the legal questions . . . presented will be resolved. . . .’”); Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)
(noting the difference between actual injury redressable by the court, which tends to be a
legal question presented to the court, and standing, which “assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact”).
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (denying standing on the
theory that injuries due to surveillance were “too speculative”); Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (denying standing in a taxpayer lawsuit);
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974) (denying
standing where the lawsuit was based on complaints held in common with all members of
public). But see United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S.
297, 299, 323–34, 326 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (acknowledging Laird yet concurring that judicial approval was required prior to the initiation of government domestic
searches or surveillance, in accordance with applicable U.S. law).
Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics, WASH.
MONTHLY, Jan. 1970.

Feb. 2016]

LAIRD V. TATUM AND ARTICLE III STANDING

1057

“[t]he U.S. Army has been closely watching civilian political activity
within the United States. Nearly 1,000 plainclothes [Army] investigators . . . keep track of political protests of all kinds—from Klan rallies
5
in North Carolina to anti-war speeches at Harvard.” Further, Pyle
claimed that the Army kept “files on the membership, ideology, programs, and practices of virtually every activist political group in the
6
country.” Army officials initially denied Pyle’s claims, but Congress,
the press, and the public were becoming increasingly unimpressed
with the integrity of military leadership at that time, especially after
the November 1969 revelations of the My Lai Massacre and the sub7
sequent attempted cover-up by U.S. officials. The article sparked inquiries from dozens of senators and congressmen, and the Army’s
general counsel responded by asserting that he had ordered the Army Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird, Maryland to destroy its
8
civilian surveillance databases. He failed to mention, however, that
the Army continued to maintain volumes of “Counterintelligence” information on paper, microfilm, and regional databanks on “Organizations of Interest and Individuals of Interest,” which included details
on thousands of organizations and individuals, from the John Birch
9
Society, to the Urban League, to Martin Luther King, Jr.
It is no surprise that these revelations elicited a strong response
from Americans. Since the founding, U.S. citizens have been ambivalent when it comes to a standing military, with the Third Amendment
10
The nation’s
being a tangible recognition of this philosophy.
5
6

7

8

9

10

Id.
Id.; see also SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIAN
POLITICS, S. REP. NO. 87-312, at 4–5 (1973) (discussing the history of military surveillance).
By the end of the 1960s, the U.S. government was losing what little support they once had
among the American people for the interminable war in Vietnam. This growing antimilitary and anti-government sentiment exploded when the news of the My Lai Massacre—and the Army’s initial attempts to cover it up—became publicly known. See generally
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH
OF LAW? 29 (1976) (discussing the May Lai Massacre and the Army’s attempt to cover it
up); WILLIAM R. PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY 3, 5, 9 (1979) (same).
At the time of Pyle’s article, Congress was beginning to take an early interest in the issue
of government computer databases, with inquiries into security clearances for scientific
personnel as well as the growing number of Secret Service databases. Pyle’s article gave
Senator Sam Ervin, then chairman of the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, the
fodder to move forward with hearings. Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Revisited: The Army
Covers Up, THE WASH. MONTHLY, July 1970, at 49–58.
Id.; see also SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIAN
POLITICS, S. REP. NO. 87-312, at 4–5 (1973); Clay Risen, Spies Among Us, 78 AM. SCHOLAR
49, 49–51, 60 (2008).
See JOAN M. JENSEN, ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775–1980, at 72–75 (1991) (“The
ambivalence of the War Department about its first officer spy hero before World War I re-
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Founders were not naïve, however, and allowed for the provision,
under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, of statutory procedures
11
for the use of the military to restore public order. These procedures, however, were constrained to three possible uses: (1) the President may use federal forces upon a request by a state legislature to
restore civil order, (2) the President may deploy federal forces to
combat a rebellion against the federal government, and (3) the President may use federal forces if a state denies constitutional rights to a
12
part of that state’s population. There is no such provision for the
use of federal troops to surveil U.S. citizens prior to any legal commitment by the President. Congress further strengthened this separation when it passed the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which forbade
the use of military forces in law enforcement, except when expressly
13
authorized by Congress. It should be noted, however, that, beginning with the Reagan Administration, the increasing use of federal
14
military forces in the war on drugs has weakened this barrier.
II. LAIRD V. TATUM AND THE QUESTION OF STANDING
North Carolina Senator Samuel Ervin, Jr., chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, held extensive inquiries regarding Pyle’s allegations in
1971, placing a large body of testimony and documentation regard15
ing Army surveillance into the public record. A number of organi-

11

12
13
14

15

flected the ambivalence of the American government and people.”); William S. Fields &
David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Maintenance of Standing Armies: A
Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 393, 431 (1991).
See Robert Reinders, Militia and Public Order in Nineteenth-Century America, 11 J. AM.
STUDIES 81, 83 (1977) (stating that Article I, Section 8, paragraphs 15–16 reflected a
compromise among the Framers which allows for a national role in public security).
Id. at 83–84.
Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement,
21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 384 (2003).
Enacted in 1981, the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act encouraged military agencies to supply intelligence, equipment, and training to civilian police
departments. Pub. L. No. 97–86 § 905, 95 Stat. 1115 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 371–82 (2012)). In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress continued to expand the military’s
ability to work directly with civilian law enforcement, through such legislation as the National Defense Authorization Act, which authorized and funded direct National Guard
participation in drug operations. See EVAN MUNSING & CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, JOINT
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE—SOUTH: THE BEST KNOWN, LEAST UNDERSTOOD INTERAGENCY
SUCCESS 10–11, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES (2011); Kealy, supra note
13, at 383.
Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Federal
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zations and people mentioned as surveillance targets in the Army
documents initiated a suit challenging the constitutionality of these
16
Army surveillance programs in February 1970. The plaintiffs, including Arlo Tatum, then Executive Secretary of the General Committee for Conscientious Objectors, sought injunctive and declaratory
relief from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and several high17
ranking Army officials. The defendants immediately filed motions
to dismiss with the district court, refusing to discuss the specific Army
intelligence activities, but assured the court of their legality, and
claimed that the Laird plaintiffs had failed to state claims upon which
18
relief could be granted.
In their complaint, the Laird plaintiffs did not assert that the Army
had made any attempts to directly control protest or speech. Instead,
they argued that the Army’s domestic surveillance programs created
19
with them an inhibiting force on First Amendment liberties. Indeed, in his concurring opinion in Lamont v. Postmaster General, Justice William Brennan stated that the “inhibition as well as prohibition
against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power
20
denied to government.” This was exactly what the Laird plaintiffs
sought to challenge: a nationwide domestic surveillance program,
conducted by the Army, creates a “dragnet which may enmesh any21
one.”
District of Columbia District Court Judge George Hart, Jr. heard
22
oral argument on the motions in April 1970. The plaintiffs had
brought with them a number of former Army military intelligence
agents who were prepared to testify on their behalf on the nature and
23
Judge Hart,
scope of the Army’s civilian surveillance programs.
however, refused to allow the plaintiffs to present any witnesses, and
concluded on the papers that the surveillance activity in question was

16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23

Data Banks Hearings]; see also Lawrence M. Baskir, Reflections on the Senate Investigation of
Army Surveillance, 49 IND. L.J. 618, 618–21 (1974) (discussing Senator Ervin’s inquiries).
Military Surveillance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on
the Judicary, 93rd Cong. 1, 79–82 (1974) [hereinafter Military Surveillance Hearings] (statement of John H.F. Shattuck, National Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 948–49 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev’d, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Military
Surveillance Hearings, supra note 16, at 79–82; Pyle, supra note 8, at 49, 54–55.
Laird, 444 F.2d at 948–49.
See Ralph Michael Stein, Laird v. Tatum: The Supreme Court and a First Amendment Challenge
to Military Surveillance of Lawful Civilian Political Activity, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 244, 246
(1973).
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965).
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937).
See Stein, supra note 19, at 247.
Id.
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no more intrusive than collecting clippings of news media reports,
24
which was constitutional. Judge Hart granted the Army’s motion to
dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged any unconstitu25
tional conduct on the part of defendants.
The Laird plaintiffs appealed this ruling, and the D.C. Court of
Appeals remanded the case back to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing, finding that “[b]ecause the evil alleged in the Army intelligence system is that of overbreadth . . . and because there is no
indication that a better opportunity will later arise to test the constitutionality of the Army’s action, the issue can be considered justicia26
ble at this time.” The court further stated that “[t]he compilation of
data by a civilian investigation agency is thus not the threat to civil
liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of
free speech that such action by the military is,” and ordered the Dis27
trict Court to re-hear the case.
The defendants appealed the order of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on the issues of justiciability
28
and standing. The plaintiffs asked the Court to affirm the Court of
Appeals order for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that the record as
it existed was not sufficient for a determination of the constitutional
issues before the District Court. In addition to the parties’ briefs, a
group of twenty-nine former military intelligence officers and agents
29
filed an amicus brief with the Court. In their brief, the amici informed the Court that the Army’s domestic surveillance programs
went far beyond mere newspaper article clippings, and included such
activities as widespread agent infiltration into civilian groups, agents
posing as journalists with falsified identification, and assigning agents
to stake out Martin Luther King, Jr.’s gravesite and keep records of
30
visitors.
In June 1972, Chief Justice Warren Burger issued the majority (54) opinion of the Court, reversing the Court of Appeals order, and
31
thus affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action.
The Court agreed with the defendants’ claim that their surveillance
programs were put into place in the anticipation of civil disorder,

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 247–48.
Laird, 444 F.2d at 948–49, 962–63; Stein, supra note 19, at 248.
Laird, 444 F.2d at 955–56.
Id. at 957.
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3 (1972).
See Stein, supra note 19, at 250 (discussing the amicus brief).
Id. at 250–51.
Laird, 408 U.S. at 2–3.
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with no actual or threatened injury by these programs. More relevant
to this Essay, however, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to sue, stating that
[The plaintiffs’] approach would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such
a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and
the ‘power of the purse’; it is not the role for the judiciary, absent actual
present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful gov32
ernmental action.

This opinion was a dramatic departure from First Amendment
precedent, where courts had created a standard of justiciability in
First Amendment cases that was less restrictive than in cases where
constitutional rights were not at stake. For example, in Reed Enterprises v. Corcoran, the court held that “[w]here the plaintiff complains of
chills and threats in the protected First Amendment area, a court is
more disposed to find that he is presenting a real and not an abstract
33
controversy.” In Dombrowski v. Pfister, the Supreme Court held that
First Amendment rights were “of transcendent value to all society,
and not merely to those exercising their rights,” noting that
“[b]ecause of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all those subject to overbroad
34
regulations risk prosecution to test their rights.” It is also noteworthy that, prior to Laird, the Supreme Court had flatly rejected a “balancing test” between constitutionally protected expression and national security:
Faced with a clear conflict between a federal statute enacted in the interests of national security and an individual’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, we have confined our analysis to whether Congress has
adopted a constitutional means in achieving its concededly legitimate
legislative goal. . . . [W]e have in no way “balanced” those respective interests. We have ruled only that the Constitution requires that the conflict between congressional power and individual rights be accommodat35
ed by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict.

In his dissent in Laird, Justice William Douglas observed that the
majority’s conclusory opinion was “too transparent for serious argument,” and stated “[o]ne need not wait to sue until he loses his job or
until his reputation is defamed. To withhold standing to sue until
that time arrives would in practical effect immunize from judicial
scrutiny all surveillance activities, regardless of their misuse and their
32
33
34
35

Id. at 15.
Reed Enters. v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
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deterrent effect.” 36 In a separate dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Potter Stewart and John Marshall, strongly disagreed with the
majority’s denial of standing, stating “[r]espondents may or may not
be able to prove the case they allege. But I agree with the Court of
37
Appeals that they are entitled to try.”
III. JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND RECUSAL
In addition to the flawed reasoning by the majority in Laird regarding standing and justiciability in First Amendment cases, a serious impartiality question was raised by then-Justice William
Rehnquist’s participation in the majority opinion. Prior to his 1972
appointment to the Supreme Court, Rehnquist was an Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Coun38
sel (“OLC”). While he was with the OLC, Rehnquist appeared before Senator Ervin’s 1971 hearings on the very subject matter raised
39
in Laird. During these hearings, Rehnquist testified as to the legality
of the military domestic surveillance programs, and directly opined
on the Laird case, then before the D.C. Court of Appeals:
My only point of disagreement with [Senator Ervin] is to say whether as
in the case of Tatum v. Laird that has been pending in the Court of Appeals here in the District of Columbia that an action will lie by private citizens to enjoin the gathering of information by the executive branch
where there has been no threat of compulsory process and no pending
40
action against any of those individuals on the part of the Government.

The opinion given by then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist
bears a striking similarity to the conclusion later reached by the Laird
Court: chilling effects alone do not warrant standing.
The Laird plaintiffs sought the recusal of Justice Rehnquist based
on the clear appearance of bias, citing the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which states, in part, that “[a] judge should perform the duties of his
office impartially and diligently,” and “should disqualify himself in a
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
36
37
38

39

40

Laird, 408 U.S. at 24, 26 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592 (1987)
(describing Justice Rehnquist’s role as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel to the White House).
See id. (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s testimony before the Senate Committee); Military
Surveillance Hearings, supra note 16, at 90 n.3 (explaining that Justice Rehnquist’s decision
in Laird was controversial due to his testimony before the Senate Committee); Federal Data
Banks Hearings, supra note 15, at 597 (providing Justice Rehnquist’s testimony before the
Senate committee).
Federal Data Banks Hearings, supra note 15, at 864–65.
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including but not limited to instances where . . . he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disput41
ed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” In October 1972,
Justice Rehnquist issued an unprecedented sixteen-page memorandum where he denied the motion for recusal, acknowledging that
42
“fair minded judges might disagree” about this matter. Justice
Rehnquist further noted that his recusal could result in “the principle
43
of law presented by the case [remaining] unsettled.” This last point
was clearly erroneous, however, as a divided Court in Laird would only ensure an evidentiary hearing at the District Court level, which
would make a record for later review, possibly by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION: LAIRD’S LEGACY
Our courts have long operated under the assumption that the
Constitution requires that conflicts between legislative power and individual rights can only be accommodated by legislation that is drawn
more narrowly so as to avoid that conflict—it is government that must
adjust to the Constitution, not the other way around. As Chief Justice
John Marshall observed in McCulloch v. Maryland, “[l]et the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
44
constitution, are constitutional.” The Laird Court failed to live up to
this standard when it refused to grant Article III standing to citizens
who sought to show that the Army’s domestic surveillance programs
did not conform with the Constitution. This seriously flawed opinion
has become the basis for similar denials of standing for those seeking
to challenge government surveillance programs. As Justice Douglas
observed in his Laird dissent, “[t]his case involves a cancer in our
45
body politic.”
It didn’t take long for courts to embrace Laird as a useful tool to
dismiss cases where plaintiffs sought to challenge government surveillance programs, especially where the complaints rested on a First
Amendment chill from political profiling by law enforcement. Some
judges took exception to a broad interpretation of Laird, but objec41
42
43
44
45

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES CANON 3, 3(C)(1) (1972).
See Note, Justice Rehnquist’s Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 106,
121 (1973) (quoting Justice Renquist’s justification for denying the motion).
Id. at 123 (quoting Justice Rehnquist).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tions largely showed up in dissenting opinions. For the most part,
early interpretations of Laird sympathized with the government’s view
of surveillance claims.
For example, about a month after the Supreme Court handed
down its decision denying Article III standing to the plaintiffs in
Laird, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cited
the decision in a case involving the open surveillance of demonstrations and meetings by the Richmond, Virginia police, which included
the photographing of participants for the purposes of establishing
and maintaining police files, which were then shared with other law
46
enforcement agencies. The plaintiffs in Donohoe objected to the police surveillance, arguing that the presence of police officers and use
of police photographers violated their First Amendment rights by in47
hibiting their ability to freely speak and associate. The Richmond
police argued that they had a duty to “know who the leaders (of the
demonstrations) are” in order to determine whether any demonstra48
tors were “dangerous.” The police further pointed out that they only attended meetings held on public streets and spaces, and did not
attend a series of protest meetings held at a local church (although
they did park a police car outside the church to take photographs of
49
everyone entering and leaving the meeting).
The Donohoe plaintiffs asserted that, despite (and because of) the
fact that the Richmond police were conducting their surveillance in
the open, participation in these demonstrations and meetings was
50
chilled. The court, however, disagreed, observing that the plaintiffs
made no claims that could provide a basis for standing, and stated
that just because the police presence and photography made the participants “nervous” or “felt uncomfortable” was not enough to estab51
lish any First Amendment harms under Laird. The court also dismissed the testimony of a meeting attendee who stated that the FBI
told his employer that he had participated in a demonstration, stating
that “[i]t is common knowledge . . . that the FBI maintains its own
surveillance of demonstration groups” and there was “no evidence
that the FBI had actually secured this information from the Rich52
mond police department.” The Donohoe court cited Laird, holding
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

See generally Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 198–99.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 200.

Feb. 2016]

LAIRD V. TATUM AND ARTICLE III STANDING

1065

that standing cannot arise “‘merely from the individual’s knowledge
that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from
the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those
activities, the agency might in the future take some other and addi53
tional action detrimental to that individual.’” To put it plainly, “allegations of a subjective ‘chill’” from the presence of government
agents photographing meeting participants for inclusion in police
54
files “will not suffice.”
Not every judge agreed with this interpretation. In Fifth Avenue
Peace Parade Committee v. Gray, Judge James Oakes dissented from the
majority opinion following Laird, observing in rather understated
tones that “[t]here has been detected a tendency in recent times to
justify invasion of constitutional rights on the basis of national securi55
ty.” These rights, which include the “right . . . peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances . . . necessarily implied a right to freedom in political
56
associations.” Judge Oakes articulated the premise that
a group, even a huge group, of people who want to go to the seat of government to protest a war and who do so peaceably have the right not to
have their name (and hence their views against the administration or the
Congress or the courts or the policies of any in relation to the war) listed
in some dossier or table or catalog of protesters and disseminated
throughout all the major branches of the ‘security system’ of the United
57
States.

Judge Oakes distinguished Laird on the basis that the Supreme
Court’s decision should be “‘narrow[ly]’ limited to general surveil58
lance without specific misuse of data.”
That is to say, the Laird majority, in Judge Oakes’s words, “seriously underestimated the size and scope of [government] intelligence
activities which included gathering public and private information on
hundreds of thousands of ‘politically suspect’ persons,” and might
have decided differently had they the benefit of Senator Ervin’s hear59
ings and “Watergate-allied events” at the time of their decision. One
could make an argument that the Burger Court would not have decided differently in Laird, even if the caustic repercussions of

53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 201 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 11).
Id. at 202.
480 F.2d 326, 333 (1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 334.
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 336–37.
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COINTELPRO, 60 Watergate, and the many post-Cold War government intelligence abuses were made public at the time. But perhaps,
in a post-Snowden world where issues of government surveillance are
perhaps even more pressing than in the days of Laird, we should be
asking these same questions of the Roberts Court.

60

COINTELPRO was the FBI’s acronym for their large-scale, secret Counterintelligence
Program, which used techniques originally approved for use against foreign enemies and
applied them against domestic political groups. The program was started by FBI Director
J. Edgar Hoover in 1956 and originally targeted the Communist Party, with the intent to
“disrupt” or “neutralize” organizations and individuals. COINTELPRO quickly expanded
to include any individual or group Hoover considered to be “subversive,” leading the
Church Committee to later observe that the program “demonstrates the dangers inherent
in the overbroad collection of domestic intelligence.” SETH ROSENFELD, SUBVERSIVES:
THE FBI’S WAR ON STUDENT RADICALS, AND REAGAN’S RISE TO POWER 16, 213–14 (2012).

